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Abstract 
The latent structure of a Swedish version of Wallerstein’s Scales of Psychological Capacities 
(PSYCAP) was tried with confirmatory (CFA) and exploratory factor analyses (EFA), based 
on PSYCAP ratings for 207 patients with severe psychiatric disorder. As a first step, the 
original theoretical model with three types of capacity (capacity to relate to self, capacity to 
regulate self, and capacity to relate to others) was tried with a CFA. This model had a poor fit 
to the data, as estimated with a number of fit measures. PSYCAP data was then entered into 
an EFA, which suggested an alternative model with three factors. The fit-test of this model 
suggested that the fit was reasonable. The three factors of the alternative model were used to 
compute subscales, and a satisfying reliability was established. The subscales also 
demonstrated adequate ability to discriminate between subjects at different levels of 
psychological functioning, as assessed with Kernberg’s concept of personality organization. 
This study provided some support to the PSYCAP as a personality measure based on an 
integrative theoretical model. Some of the problems with using CFA on personality data were 
highlighted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is a growing interest in integrative models of the mind (Jensen, Bergin, & Greaves, 
1990; Spaulding, 1994; Wachtel, 1997). An important contribution in this line of work is the 
formulation of the concept of psychological capacity (Wallerstein, 1988a; 1990), defined as 
an accessible psychological resource that should be critical for psychological adjustment. 
Wallerstein and his colleagues (1988a;  Wallerstein et al., 1989) defined a set of seventeen 
psychological capacities in terms of surface themes (Wiggins, 1982), in a way that ”adherents 
of all prevailing psychodynamic theoretical perspectives can agree are attributes that 
comprehensively describe personality functioning and that will necessarily shift if there is 
‘underlying’ change in intrapsychic structure, however those intrapsychic structures or the 
structural change are conceptualized” (Wallerstein, 1988b, p. 255). A subject’s psychological 
capacities may be normally unfolded or they may be impaired, and the cause of impairment 
might be 1) a genetically limited emotional reactivity; 2) the missing of a critical period of 
empathic interaction with a mother figure; 3) an impaired parental environment or 4) an 
intrapsychic conflict (Zilberg, Wallerstein, DeWitt, Hartley, & Rosenberg, 1991).  
Initially, the set of psychological capacities were organized into three groups: 1) relationship 
with self, 2) regulations of self and 3) relationship with others were described (DeWitt, 
Hartley, Rosenberg, Zilberg, & Wallerstein, 1991; Wallerstein et al., 1989). The capacities 
should be mildly to moderately correlated to each other, and other psychological resources 
should either be derived from these seventeen capacities or relatively unimportant in helping 
to achieve an adaptive psychological functioning. 
To assess the seventeen psychological capacities, Wallerstein and his coworkers 
constructed the Scales of Psychological Capacities (SPC) (Wallerstein, 1988b). The SPC 
measures the relevant directions of deviation for each capacity, basically of exaggerated 
functioning, inhibited functioning, and sometimes also of deformed functioning with one, 
two, or three variables. In all there are 38 variables, grouped according to the three different 
types of psychological capacity (capacity to relate to self, regulate self, and relate to others). 
To guide assessment of a subject’s psychological capacities, a manual was constructed 
(Wallerstein et al., 1989) where definitions of normal presence of the individual psychological 
capacities are given along with clinical vignettes and descriptions of problems that are 
relevant for each psychological capacity. The SPC recognizes that a subject may have 
problems with a certain psychological capacity in more than one direction which implies that 
problems with a psychological capacity are not bipolar but may well be dualistic or pluralistic. 
For example, a subject who has problems to empathize with others may be egocentric and/or 
emotionally blunting, and/or (s)he may have a tendency to become emotionally absorbed. 
Summing up, the concept of psychological capacity represents an effort to define the common 
denominator within psychodynamic theory, it also suggests a list of small building-blocks of 
mental activities that may prove useful in a psychodynamic-cognitive model. 
A Swedish version of the Scales of Psychological Capacities, the PSYCAP, has been 
designed, and its interrater reliability and internal consistency has been examined in two 
studies (Sundin, Armelius, & Nilsson, 1994). On the basis of the reliability studies Sundin et 
al. (1994) revised  the PSYCAP and 15 items were reformulated. These reformulations did 
not alter the conceptual structure of Wallerstein’s Scales of Psychological Capacities; a) the 
38 items were still arranged in three categories, b) a subject may exhibit problems with a 
certain psychological capacity in one, two or three directions. A back-translation confirmed 
that the Swedish version was true to the original SPC, except for the items that we had 
reformulated. In a later study (Sundin & Armelius, 1998), the PSYCAP was shown to 
produce a substantial amount of information independently of adjustment, a finding that 
supported the PSYCAP as a valid personality measure. The PSYCAP is shown in Table 1.  
For the whole scale (38 PSYCAP items) interrater reliability and internal consistency was 
adequate (ICC [1,1] was .64 and .65 respectively, α  was .84). When treating the items 
designed to measure each of the three types of capacity as subscales (I. the Self-scale, II. the 
Selfregulation-scale, and III. the Relationship-scale), the internal consistencies were less 
encouraging (for the three subscales, α  was .64, .27. and .72 respectively). The present study 
examined the empirical validity of the theoretical assumption that there are three types of 
capacities by means of a theory-testing factor analysis.  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                           Table 1 goes about here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Methods 
Subjects  
This study involved two samples. The first sample consisted of 27 psychiatric 
inpatients, excluded were geriatric patients and drug-abusers, patients with organic syndromes 
and long-standing psychotic disorders. The average age of the psychiatric inpatients was 35 
years, 39% of them were women. The second sample contained 180 subjects with severe 
psychiatric illnesses who were inpatients at small treatment units that provide a special type of 
psychiatric treatment and care to small groups of inpatients in family-like settings. (Armelius, 
1991). The average age was 30 years (sd =8), 46% of the patients were female.  
Instruments and procedures 
DSM‐III‐R 
The psychiatric inpatients were diagnosed according to the DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1987). For the majority of the subjects, diagnoses were made retrospectively by 
expert clinicians on the basis of journal data and a detailed knowledge of their treatment. 68% 
of the patients in this study had an Axis I diagnosis as main diagnosis, including 42% with 
schizophrenic disorder. Eleven percent of the patients qualified for an Axis II diagnosis but 
had no Axis I diagnosis. The most common diagnosis was borderline personality disorder. 
Twenty-one percent had not been diagnosed according to the DSM-III-R.  
PO 
All participants were also given a psychodynamic diagnosis according to Kernberg’s (1975) 
concept of personality organization (PO). The concept of PO resonates the theoretical 
assumption that there are three qualitatively different types of psychic structure, neurotic PO 
(NPO), borderline PO (BPO), and psychotic PO (PPO)., where PPO is on the lowest level of 
mental health, NPO is on the highest and BPO is in-between (1990). The PO diagnoses was 
made by clinicians and clinical researchers who assessed three aspects of the subject’s 
psychological functioning: degree of identity integration, level of defensive operations and 
reality testing. Assessments were made on a five-point rating-scale on the basis of information 
culled from a structural interview (Kernberg, 1981). These assessments were then 
summarized into a PO diagnosis. Support for interrater reliability (Armelius, Sundbom, 
Fransson, & Kullgren, 1990; Kullgren, 1987) and validity (Kullgren & Armelius, 1990; 
Sundbom, Kullgren, & Armelius, 1989) of assessment according to PO has been presented. In 
our two samples, 113 patients were diagnosed with PPO, 62 had BPO, and 27 were deemed to 
have NPO. 5 patients had not received a PO diagnosis. 
PSYCAP 
All subjects participated in an individual interview following a format (Sundin, 1993) 
developed to collect information for assessments with the PSYCAP. The interviews were 
conducted and video-recorded by a group of ten clinicians and clinical researchers who also 
did independent assessments of the 38 PSYCAP items, guided by the manual (Wallerstein et 
al., 1989). Assessments were made on a four-point measurement-scale where scale-point ‘0’ 
indicates a normal capacity, and scale-points ‘1’, ‘2’, and ‘3’ measure different degrees of 
severity of personality problems. To secure a homogenous interview style and reliable 
PSYCAP assessments, the judges met regularly. The judges reported that they often had 
difficulties to obtain information from the subjects for the two items that measure the capacity 
to regulate sexuality. A preliminary inspection of the independent PSYCAP ratings suggested 
that all items had a satisfying interrater reliability except for these two items, and they were 
therefor excluded from further analyses, leaving us with data on 36 PSYCAP items.  
Statistical procedures 
To examine the conceptual structure of the 36 items PSYCAP, we computed a confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA), using AMOS (Analysis of Moment Structures) (Arbuckle, 1997) 
statistical package. In contrast to an exploratory factor analysis (EFA), which is a theory-
generating procedure that determines the number of factors and whether the factors are 
correlated or uncorrelated, the CFA provides researchers with a theory-testing procedure 
where a model is created in advance, based on a strong theoretical (or empirical) foundation 
(Stevens, 1996). The model specifies the number of unobserved factors, whether these factors 
are correlated or uncorrelated, and which variables will load on which factor (or factors). The 
residuals for the latent variable value’s structural equation latent variables are also included in 
the model ("v error"). 
With AMOS, the adequacy of the model based on the researchers’ hypothesis is 
tested with an overall chi square ( ). This chi square statistic estimates the fit of the model 
to the data, and  p is the probability of getting as large a discrepancy as occurred with the 
sample, if the hypothesis that the model fits the population is true. Chi-square is a badness-of-
fit measure in the sense that a small chi-square corresponds to good fit and a large chi-square 
to bad fit. Zero chi-square corresponds to perfect fit. Thus, a nonsignificant chi-square value 
(p >.05) indicates a good fit between the model and the data structure. However, there are 
several problems with this statistic, maybe the most important is that it is sensitive to 
departures from multivariate normality (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1983). Research into impact of 
non-normality distributed data has suggested that the chi-square value tend to be positively 
inflated and thus to reject too frequently fitted CFA models (Curran, West, & Finch, 1996; 
Hu, Bentler, & Kano, 1992). Second, in more complex problems, the chi square statistic will 
nearly always be statistically significant (Marsh & Hocevar, 1985). A third problem is that it 
is sensitive to sample size; with increasingly large samples the more likely the rejection of the 
model and the more likely a Type II error (Bentler & Bonett, 1980; Cochran, 1952; Gulliksen 
& Tukey, 1958; Marsh & Balla, 1994).  
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Therefor, several writers have recommended that the researcher report multiple 
indexes of fit, which evaluates the fit of the model slightly different (Browne & Mels, 1992; 
Hoyle & Panter, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 1995; Jaccard & Wan, 1996), and along with the overall 
chi square test, AMOS provides a large number of other fit indexes. Following Browne and 
Mels (1992), we elected to report overall chi square ( ), relative chi-square ( ), and 
RMSEA (the root mean square error of approximation) with 90% confidence interval. The 
relative chi-square ( ) accounts for the degrees of freedom needed to fit the model, and 
is an attempt to make the test statistic less dependent of sample size (Wheaton et al., 1977). 
Different ratios have been suggested to be indicative of a satisfactory fit. Marsh and Hocevar 
(1985) suggested that ratios of 5.00 or less are reasonable, Carmines and McIver (1981) 
suggested that ratios below 3.00 are indicative of an acceptable fit, while Byrne (1989) argued 
that only a ratio below 2.00 represents an adequate fit between the hypothetical model and the 
sample data. The RMSEA determines the proportion of variance not explained by the model 
2χ df/2χ
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and thus provides a ‘badness-of-fit’ estimate. This fit statistic has been found to be relatively 
unaffected by sample size, and shows the model’s badness of fit per degree of freedom at 
various model complexity levels (Marsh & Balla, 1994). According to Browne and Cudeck 
(1993), a value of 0.08 or smaller for RMSEA indicate a close fit while an RMSEA greater 
that 0.1 suggests that the model has a poor fit. A 90 percent confidence interval of an RMSEA 
value, especially its left endpoint, and a test of RMSEA  <.05 is informative for evaluation of 
the fit of a model (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; Marsh & Balla, 1994).  
AMOS also provides comparative fit statistics, which compares the specified 
model with a null model (or independent model), which assumes no common factors. We 
elected CFI (the comparative fit index), which is a normed fit index that performs well at 
different sample sizes (Bentler, 1990). CFI values fall in the range from 0 to 1, values close to 
1 indicate a very good fit. 
Following the data structure theory implicit in the assumption of three types of psychological 
capacity (Wallerstein, 1988b), we specified a model with three unobserved factors. According 
to this model, PSYCAP v1-v17 would cluster to form the first factor, which we called I 
Relations to self, PSYCAP v18-v23 would belong to the second factor, II. Selfregulation, and 
the remaining PSYCAP items, v24-v36, would cluster to form the third factor, labeled III. 
Relations to others. Also based on the theoretical model (Wallerstein, 1988a), we assumed 
that the correlations between the three unobserved factors would be positive, and mild to 
moderate. This model was compared to the independence model (or null model), assuming no 
underlying structure. The independence model represents the assumption that the PSYCAP 
measures general severity of psychological problems.  
RESULTS 
The latent structure of the PSYCAP 
A CFA was undertaken to test the theoretically instigated pattern with three types of 
capacities; capacity to relate to self, capacity to regulate self, and capacity to relate to others  
(Wallerstein, 1998b). In line with DeWitt et al (1991), we assumed a weak to moderate 
correlation between  the three latent factors. The model was built in AMOS, and PSYCAP 
data for the two samples (n=207) were used.   
As is shown in Table 2, the results indicated a poor fit between the empirical data and the 
specified model (listed as Model B. Original in Table 2). Overall chi square was very large 
( = 2400.38) and so was relative chi square ( =4.06). RMSEA was 0.12, which 
indicates that a notable portion of variance was not explained by the model. A comparison of 
Model B with the independence model, which is built on the assumption that the variables in 
the model are completely uncorrelated,  the original model offers a slightly improved fit to the 
data structure (CFI = .80). The three subscales were moderately to strongly related to each 
other (a moderate Pearson correlation was obtained between factors 1 and 2 (.64) and factors 
2 and 3 (.55), the correlation between factors 2 and 3 was strong (.95).  
2χ df/2χ
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                            
                                                  Table 2 goes about here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In an attempt to improve the original model, we performed an exploratory factor analysis 
(EFA) with oblique rotation on the basis of the PSYCAP ratings for the two samples (n=207). 
Ten factors with eigenvalues greater than one (7.8, 4.7, 2.5, 1.9, 1.7, 1.6, 1.2, 1.1, 1.1, 1.0) 
were identified. Scree plot criteria (Cattell, 1966) to determine the number of meaningful 
factors indicated that the factor structure was best described as having three factors, which 
was the number of factors specified in the original model. The three largest factors accounted 
for 22.6, 13.1, and 6.9.respectively (or 41.5% of the total variance explained). Table 3 shows 
all loadings above⏐.50⏐ on the three largest oblique factors. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                             Table 3 goes about here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
In all, 18 of the 36 PSYCAP variables had loadings > ⏐.50⏐ on one of the three factors, two 
of these variables loaded above⏐.50⏐ on two factors. This model (Model D. EFA  in Table 2) 
was tested with a CFA, based on the same set of PSYCAP data (n=207). As is shown in Table 
2, suggested that this model had a poor fit to the data. In contrast, the results from the 
relative chi square test ( = 2.46) and the RMSEA (.08)  suggested that the fit between 
Model B had an acceptable fit. This model also had a substantially improved fit compared to 
the independence model, suggested by CFI (.96).  
2χ
df/2χ
PSYCAP subscales 
Three subscales were constructed on the basis of Model D EFA. Five variables loaded above 
⏐.50⏐ on factor 1, four of them dealt with depressed mood and one variable tapped negative 
image of self. This factor was named PSYCAP1 Capacity to handle negative affects. The 
second factor carried 6 variable loadings above ⏐.50⏐, all of which dealt with difficulties to 
manage impulses and affects, and to follow socially accepted rules and conventions. This 
factor was labeled PSYCAP2 Capacity to abide by standards and rules. The third factor had 9 
variable loadings above⏐.50⏐, 6 of them dealt with difficulties in relations to others, the other 
three variable loadings were v1 Incoherent self, v33 Difficulties to rely on self, and v9 
Rigidity. This factor was labeled PSYCAP3 Capacity to relate to others. 
Internal consistencies for the PSYCAP subscales are tabulated in Table 4 to Table 6. The 
internal consistencies for the three subscales were adequate (α was .81, .84, and .85 
respectively), which suggested that each subscale measures a homogenous construct.     
__________________________________________________________________________ 
                                             Tables 4 - 6 go about here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In Table 7 we see that the correlation between PSYCAP1 and PSYCAP2 was weak (r=.26), 
while moderate correlations were obtained between PSYCAP1 and PSYCAP3 (r=.54) and 
between PSYCAP2 and PSYCAP3 (r=.61).  
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                             Table 7 goes about here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Criterion-related validity 
To examine if the PSYCAP subscales discriminated between psychiatric patients grouped 
according to Kernberg’s personality organization, an analysis of variance was computed 
based on the PSYCAP data from the two samples (n=207). Those who were judged to have a 
neurotic PO were expected to exhibit relatively well-developed psychological capacities. The 
groups of psychiatric patients who had obtained borderline and psychotic PO respectively 
were assumed to present severely impaired psychological resources. The mean scores on the 
three PSYCAP subscales by Kernberg’s PO  (NPO, BPO, and PPO) are tabulated in Table 8. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
                                             Table 8 goes about here 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
As can be seen in Table 8, the average PSYCAP subscale scores for psychiatric inpatients 
with NPO suggested that their psychological resources were mildly to moderately impaired 
while those with PPO had severe psychological problems, especially to handle emotion as 
measured with PSYCAP1 and PSYCAP2. The mean scores for patients with BPO were in-
between those with NPO and PPO. Analyses of variance revealed a significant difference 
between the three groups on all the three PSYCAP subscales [F(2, 201) = 24.78, ρ  < .001, 
F(2, 201) = 5.12, ρ  < .007, and F(2, 200) = 5.63, ρ  < .004). Post hoc analyses was 
conducted using Bonferroni test for multiple comparisons to determine which groups were the 
sources of variance. Alpha was set at .01. The results showed that patients with PPO had 
significantly more problems to handle negative affect compared to patients with NPO (p < 
.001) and BPO (p >.001). PPO patients had more difficulties to abide by rules and 
conventions compared to patients with BPO (p < .001). On PSYCAP3, both BPO and PPO 
patients had more difficulties to relate to others than patients with NPO (p < .005 and p < .007 
respectively).  
Discussion 
This study contributes to the efforts towards unification and integration of different theoretical 
perspectives. The confirmatory and exploratory factor analyses suggested a model with three 
meaningful factors that may prove useful in the investigation of various maladaptive 
psychological patterns. The analyses suggested that ‘psychological capacity’ is best 
understood as a multidimensional construct; a model composed of three dimensions fitted the 
data better than the independence model. However, the result of the conventional model 
testing, i.e., the overall chi square was disappointing. This is not surprising, an extensive 
literature reports problems when using confirmatory factor analysis in personality research 
(Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1990; Holden & Fekken, 1994; McCrae et al., 1996), and alternative 
indexes for evaluating model fit is needed, especially in this line of research (Curran et al., 
1996; Hu, 1992). The traditional chi square index will not produce an appropriate test value 
when, as is often the case in personality research, the researcher uses a suboptimal sample 
size. The data structure of a small sample will not fit the large sample theoretical distribution 
of the chi square test statistic, and a Type I error will arise (Raykov, 1997). In addition, most 
models used in personality research are complex, and cannot reproduce perfectly a population 
covariance matrix (Raykov, 1997). Recent advances in model evaluation account for sample 
size and model complexity. Rather than the unrealistic assumption of perfect model fit to the 
population covariance matrix, these fit indexes are concerned with the assumption that the 
model is a reasonable approximation of it. In this study, we used relative chi-square ( ), 
and RMSEA as alternative ways of assessing model fit, with rther encouraging result.  
df/2χ
The original model of the latent structure of PSYCAP with three separate types of capacity 
was not supported. Instead, each of the three factors consisted of items that measure each of 
the three types of capacity. The first and second factor involved difficulties to handle emotion. 
While the first factor dealt with problems to handle negative emotion and negative self-image, 
the theme of the second was difficulties to control impulses and to abide by social rules. The 
third factor represented the capacity to relate to other people, defined by strong loadings from 
PSYCAP items that deal with difficulties to engage in reciprocal and trusting relations. In 
addition, this factor dealt with difficulties to maintain a stable and consistent image of self (v1 
Incoherent self) and refusal to accept new experiences and ideas (v12 Rigidity). There was no 
variable loading on this factor from PSYCAP items that measure difficulties to handle 
emotion and impulses on this factor. 
With the Scales of Psychological Capacities, Wallerstein and collaborators (DeWitt et al., 
1991; Wallerstein, 1988; Zilberg et al., 1991) had a twofold aim, to design a concept that 
would be useful for psychodynamic clinicians and researchers, no matter how mental 
structures and processes are defined, and to define the concept in ‘middle-language’ terms. 
The Scales of Psychological Capacities (the SPC) has been put to usage by two different 
research groups within the United States and a number of clinical workers and researchers in 
Sweden, Germany, and France, all of whom represent different theoretical directions. 
Additional support for the content validity of the measure was provided by (DeWitt et al., 
1991), who received favorable ratings with respect to the SPC’s  importance, 
comprehensiveness, clarity and vividness from 62 representatives for major psychoanalytic 
directions in seven different countries. In the present study, some support was yielded for the 
criterion-related validity of the PSYCAP. In line with Kernberg (1990), the PSYCAP 
subscales placed the PPO patients on the lowest level of psychological functioning, NPO 
patients on the highest level, and BPO in-between (1990). Further studies of the relationship 
between the PSYCAP model and other constructs may help to decide whether this model is 
useful.  
An interesting implication of this study is that Wallerstein’s conceptualization of the 
seventeen psychological capacities offers a framework for the diverse and sometimes 
incongruent findings of associations between personality traits and adjustment. For example, 
in the third factor, v1 Incoherent self clustered together with item loadings that measure 
difficulties to engage in safe and stable relations with others. This provides a potentially 
meaningful context for the widely used concept of sense of coherence (Antonovsky, 1987), 
which is defined similarly to Wallerstein’s concept of self-coherence. The first factor dealt 
with capacity to handle negative affects, mirroring the importance of what has been called 
‘dispositional optimism’, defined as a general expectancy of positive outcomes. The 
proximity between this concept and the first PSYCAP subscale is well illustrated with a study 
by Norem and Cantor (1986) where more optimistic people were found to have higher 
expectations and perceptions of control before a performance, and, if they failed, they used 
self-serving attributions to cope with the failure. Thus, Wallerstein’s concept may contribute a 
useful theoretical setting which can improve our understanding of single personality traits, 
and, it may help in creating hypotheses on relations among individual traits and their 
predictive strength.    
In sum, this study provided some support for the PSYCAP as a valid measure of personality 
structures and processes. An important task for further study is to examine the relationship 
between the three PSYCAP subscales and level of adjustment, psychiatric symptoms, and 
psychiatric disorder.  
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Table 1. The Scales of Psychological Capacities. The Swedish version. 
 
I. Self-scale 
Self-coherence 
v1. From coherence to 
inconsistency of behavior 
and experiences  
 
Self-esteem 
v2. From modesty to self-
depreciation 
V3. From self-respect to 
grandiosity  
 
Zest for life 
v4. From enjoyment of life  
to over-excitement 
v5. From appropriate 
enthusiasm to drudgery 
v6. From accepting of 
”downs” and set backs to 
apathy  
 
Hope 
v7. From hopefulness to 
extreme optimism  
v8. From hesitancy to 
extreme pessimism 
 
Flexibility 
v9. From open to closed-
mindedness 
v10. From weighing up of 
alternatives to self-doubt  
and confusion 
 
Attribution of responsibility  
v11. From taking 
responsibility to over-
internalizing  
v12. From disclaiming of 
responsibility to over-
externalizing  
 
Effectance and mastery 
v13. From pursuit of 
meaningful goals to 
drivenness and over-
achievement 
 
v14. From resourceful 
mastery to under-
achievement, inhibition of 
success  
 
Commitment to standards 
and values 
v15. From tolerance to 
excessive opposition to rules
v16. From accepting of 
norms and values to 
moralism 
v17. From adapting to other 
people’s rules to replacing 
them with one’s own rules 
 
II. Selfregulation-scale 
Affect control 
v18. From tolerance of 
affects to out of control 
”affect storms” 
v19. From modulated affects 
to hypercontrol 
 
Impulse control 
V20. From ability to indulge 
impulses to compulsive 
over-indulgence 
v21. From ability to inhibit 
impulses to constricted 
over-inhibition  
 
Sexual regulation 
v22. From volitional sexual 
expression to impulsive or 
driven expression. 
v23. From active sexual 
interest and expression to 
inhibition 
 
Self-assertion 
v24. From assertion of own 
interests to bullying 
v25. From ability to yield to 
timidity, self-abandonment 
III. Relationship-scale 
Empathy 
v26. From appropriate 
distance to egocentricity 
v27. From emotional 
responsiveness to emotional 
blunting 
v28. From taking the 
perspective of others to 
emotional absorption  
 
Trust 
v29. From evaluating others 
trustworthiness to extreme 
suspiciousness 
v30. From believing others 
to extreme gullibility 
v31. From trustworthy to 
untrustworthy 
 
Reliance on self and others 
v32. From secure reliance 
on others to rarely able to 
rely on others 
v33. From secure reliance 
on self to rarely able to rely 
on self  
v34. From security in 
having others rely on self to 
rarely able to be person 
relied upon 
 
Commitment in relations 
v35. From engagement in 
relations to compulsive 
over-involvement 
v36. From self-delimitation 
to limited, tenuous 
commitment 
 
Reciprocity 
v37. From comfortable 
taking from others to 
exploitation of others 
v38. From comfortable 
giving to others to surrender 
of self  
 
 
Table 2. Comparison of the three different AMOS models (n=207). 
Model 2χ  df ρ  df/2χ RMSEA ρ CLOSE 90% CI CFI 
       LO HI  
A. Null 9636.28 666 .001 14.47 .26 .001 .25 .26 .00 
B. Original  2400.38 592 .001        4.06 .12 .001 .12 .13 .80 
C. Null 5221.17 171 .001 14.47 .36 .001 .37 .39 .00 
D. EFA    325.24 132 .001       2.46 .08 .001 .07 .10 .96 
2χ = chi square; df = degrees of freedom as the difference between the number of distinct  
sample moments (sample variances and covariances) and the number of distinct parameters  
to be estimated; ρ  = a nonsignificant value (p > .05) indicates good fit; = chi square  
divided with df; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; Values below .8 indicates  
good fit. 
df/2χ
ρ CLOSE = a significant  value (<.05) is informative for the evaluation of the fit of a  
model; 90% CI = 90% confidence interval: CFI =  comparative fit index. Values close to 1  
indicates good fit. 
Table 3. The three largest factors based on PSYCAP ratings for the two psychiatric inpatients 
samples (n=207). 
 
PSYCAP items Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
v6 Apathy .84   
v8 Pessimism .78   
v5 Drudgery .77   
v14 Under-achievement .71   
v33 Difficulties to rely on self .61  .53 
v31 Untrustfulness  .78  
v17 Rules of one’s own  .72  
v24 Bullying others  .71  
v34 Unreliability  .63 .54 
v20 Uncontrolled impulses  .57  
v15 Externalization of responsibility  .55  
v1 Incoherent self   .73 
v27 Emotional blunting   .69 
v26 Egocentricity   .66 
v36 Limited investment in relations   .61 
v32 Difficulties to rely on others   .62 
v37 Exploitation of others   .59 
v9 Rigidity   .51 
 
Table 4. Internal consistency for PSYCAP1 Capacity to handle negative affects based on 
PSYCAP ratings for the two psychiatric inpatients samples (n=207). 
 
 Number of 
items 
α 
PSYCAP1 Capacity to handle negative 
affects 
5 .84 
 Variable-total r α when variable is deleted 
v5 Drudgery .68 .80 
v6 Apathy .73 .78 
v8 Pessimism .68 .79 
v14 Underachievement .63 .81 
v33 Difficulties to rely on self .49 .84 
 
 
Table 5. Internal consistency for PSYCAP2 Capacity to abide by standards and rules based on 
PSYCAP ratings for the two psychiatric inpatients samples (n=207). 
 Number of 
items 
α 
PSYCAP2 Capacity to abide by 
standards and rules 
6 .81 
 Variable-total r α when variable is deleted 
v12 Externalizing responsibility .51 .81 
v17 Rules of one’s own .59 .78 
v20 Difficulties to control impulses .55 .80 
v24 Bullying others .59 .79 
v31 Difficulties to be trustful .72 .76 
v34 Difficulties to be reliable .58 .79 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. Internal consistency for PSYCAP3 Capacity to relate to others based on PSYCAP 
ratings for the two psychiatric inpatients samples (n=207). 
 
 Number of 
items 
α 
PSYCAP3 Capacity to relate to others 9 .85 
 Variable-total r α when variable is deleted 
v1 Incoherent self .51 .84 
v9 Rigidity .53 .84 
v26 Egocentricity .63 .83 
v27 Emotional blunting .69 .82 
v32 Difficulties to rely on others .65 .83 
v33 Difficulties rely on self .51 .84 
v34 Difficulties to be a reliable person .52 .84 
v34 Limited investment in relations .59 .84 
v37 Exploiting others .50 .85 
 
 Table 7. Bivariate correlations between the three PSYCAP subscales based on PSYCAP 
ratings for the two psychiatric inpatients samples (n=207). 
 PSYCAP1 PSYCAP2 
PSYCAP1 1.00  
PSYCAP2     .26* 1.00 
PSYCAP3     .54*     .61* 
*** = p<.01 
 
 
Table 8. Average scores and standard deviations on the three PSYCAP subscales by 
Kernberg’s PO (n=202).  
PSYCAP subscales PSYCAP1 Capacity to 
handle negative affects
PSYCAP 2 Capacity to 
abide by standards and rules 
PSYCAP3 Capacity 
to relate to others 
PPO (n=112)   1.821) (.59)   1.682) (.76)  .993) (.65) 
BPO (n=62)   1.35   (.61)   1.37   (.64) 1.004) (.69) 
NPO (n=27)   1.04   (.61)   1.34   (.64)    .55   (.48) 
1) PPO > NPO, BPO, p <.001 
2) PPO > BPO, p <.01 
3) PPO > NPO, p < .005  
4) BPO > NPO, p < 007 
 
 
   
 
